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In this paper we study the productivity slowdown taking as a starting
point the nonlinear shape of the growth path. We relate the slowdown to the
evolution of the world income distribution in the periods before and after the
oil shock of 1973 and show that: i) in both periods growth is nonlinear; ii) the
productivity slowdown consists in a downward shift of the nonlinear growth
path; iii) in both periods we observe a medium-run tendency to polarization,
but the long-run distribution features convergence in the ﬁrst period and
polarization in the second. We provide theoretical and empirical arguments
suggesting that the interaction between nonlinear growth and international
technology spillovers can explain how a temporary shock may have permanent
eﬀects on world growth.
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In the 70s and 80s many countries have been aﬀected by a phenomenon commonly
indicated as productivity slowdown, consisting in a decrease in productivity with
permanent eﬀects on the growth rate. It is a common wisdom that the oil shock in
1973 was the source of this slowdown, but the causes of its long-run eﬀects on the
growth rate are still debated (see Fischer (1988) and the papers in the same issue).
Early contributions on endogenous growth theory appear motivated not only by the
observed lack of convergence across countries, but also by an attempt at explaining
the slowdown (see e.g. Romer (1990)).1
The aim of this paper is to oﬀer a new perspective on the productivity slowdown,
in which the focus is on the nonlinear shape of the growth process and on the
evolution of the world income distribution. We argue that the interaction between
the productivity slowdown and the cross-country growth dynamics is a key point to
understand how a temporary shock (e.g. an oil shock) can have permanent eﬀects
on world growth.
We compare the dynamics of a large sample of countries in two periods: 1950−
1973 and 1974 − 1997. Our ﬁndings are: i) in both periods growth is nonlinear; ii)
in the second period the productivity slowdown consists in a downward shift of the
nonlinear growth path; iii) in both periods we observe a medium-run tendency to
polarization, but in the ﬁrst period the long-run distribution features convergence at
high income levels, while in the second period the long-run tendency is for polariza-
tion (a result in contrast with Lucas (2000)). Finally, iv) we do not ﬁnd empirical
support for explanations of the slowdown emphasizing a reduction in the rate of
capital accumulation (see e.g. Hamilton and Monteagudo (1998)).
We argue that our results support an endogenous growth model, in which the
growth rate depends on both an internal process of accumulation, and on the inter-
national technological spillovers (see Bernard and Jones (1996)). In particular when
spillovers depend on the relative “economic distance” between countries, and can
be positive, as suggested by the literature on appropriate technology (see Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1969) and Basu and Weil (1998)),2 or negative (see Goodfriend and
McDermott (1998)).
We argue that the relation between the slowdown and the cross-country income
distribution can be summarized in the following way: the oil shock caused a sudden
increase of the rate of depreciation of capital (see Baily and Schultze (1990)), which
aﬀected negatively the rate of growth. In particular, this produced a downward
shift of the nonlinear growth path, which increased the dispersion of the world
income distribution. The greater dispersion interrupted, or made more diﬃcult,
1In addition, Feyrer (2002) argues that the productivity slowdown can be partially explained
by demographic factors.
2 Johnson (2005) shows that the development of a country is the result of two overlapping
processes, the ﬁrst related to the accumulation of physical capital, the second to the international
transfers of technology. In fact, the twin-peaked distribution of world income is the result of the
twin-peaked distribution of both total factor productivity (TFP) and capital-output ratios.3
the international ﬂow of technologies, as suggested by the theory of appropriate
technology. This had perverse eﬀects on productivity: in particular, countries in the
lower tail of the distribution, having to rely solely on internal factors, were caught
into a poverty trap.3 Productivity of countries in the higher tail did not recover for
the increased competition from follower countries (see Goodfriend and McDermott
(1998)), and for a decrease in the investment rate. Overall, a long-run tendency to
global convergence in the ﬁrst period was replaced by a tendency to polarization
(see Quah (1997)). The increased dispersion in the world income distribution may
therefore explain why, when the pre-shock conditions were restored, productivity
did not return to previous levels.
This paper adopts the distribution dynamics approach for the empirical analysis
of the productivity slowdown, and is therefore related to works such as Quah (1997)
on convergence. This approach, given its focus on the relative economic distance
between countries, is particularly well-suited to understand the international tech-
nological spillovers, when the latter depend on relative levels of capital/labour ratios
or GDP.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an empirical analysis of
growth dynamics before and after the oil shock, and evaluates the relation between
investment and growth; Section 3 assesses the capacity of alternative theoretical
frameworks to be supported by the empirical evidence, and proposes a nonlinear
growth model with international technological spillovers; Section 4 contains some
concluding remarks.
2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide an extensive empirical analysis of a sample of 122 countries
from Maddison (2001).4 In particular in Section 2.1 we analyze the distribution
dynamics of the sample in two periods: 1950 − 1973 and 1974 − 1997. We ﬁrst
consider per capita GDP in absolute terms, and then per capita GDP in relative
terms, i.e. normalized with respect to the sample average. In Appendix C we present
the results with GDP per worker.5
The use of absolute values helps to evaluate the possible presence of poverty
traps in absolute terms, and abstracts from the assumption of a world technological
trend. However, it has one drawback: care should be used when formulating long-
run predictions, given that the growth behaviour identiﬁed for some GDP levels may
not be assumed to remain the same in distant periods. The use of relative values
avoids this problem, but has the drawback of being based on a normalization which
may not be completely appropriate. As an alternative found in the literature (see,
3 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), p. 577, emphasize the dependence of technological progress on
history.
4See Appendix A for the country list. Figures are in 1990 constant dollars.
5This sample is from the Penn World Table 6.1 and includes 91 countries for the period 1961−
1997 (see Appendix A for the country list).4 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
e.g. Jones (1997)), we report in Appendix B.3 estimates for GDP normalized with
respect to US GDP.6
2.1 Distribution Dynamics
2.1.1 Absolute Values
A ﬁrst comparison of growth in the two periods reveals that 92 countries out of
122 had a lower annual average growth rate in 1974 − 1997 than in 1950 − 1973, a
well-know fact. Here we propose a representation of the growth slowdown based on
an analysis of the growth path, and not only on average growth rates. In Figure 1
we report a nonparametric regression of growth rates against the absolute value of
per capita GDP.7












































Figure 1: Growth rates vs absolute GDP: 1950-1973 and 1974-1997
In both cases the estimated growth path is nonlinear, with the turning points
broadly coincident (notice that the estimate for high and low GDP values is not
very precise, as shown by the large conﬁdence band) However, in the second period
6For further discussion on the use of absolute or relative values of GDP see Fiaschi and Lavezzi
(2005).
7For all the nonparametric estimates we used R (2005). The statistical package mgcv, if not
stated diﬀerently, is used for the nonparametric regressions (see Wood (2004)). This package
has an advantage in terms of computational time, and is used when the database is particularly
large. 95% conﬁdence bands in Figure 1 are calculated by an appropriate resampling method
(wild bootstrap), suggested by H¨ ardle et al. (2004), p. 127. Data sets and codes used in the
empirical analysis are available on the authors’ websites (http://www-dse.ec.unipi.it/ﬁaschi and
http://www-dse.ec.unipi.it/lavezzi).2.1 Distribution Dynamics 5
we observe a downward shift of the entire path. Therefore, the productivity slow-
down seems to have aﬀected the world growth path, without substantial changes in
the shape of the growth process. This evidence can be compared with the insights
provided by Galor (1996), Fig. 3, where an increase in a technology parameter shifts
upwards a nonlinear growth path. In that case the change eliminates the conver-
gence clubs; in our case it seems that the opposite has taken place as we explain in
Section 3. These hypotheses are ﬁrst tested by the estimation of Markov transition
matrices, and then by the consideration of a continuous GDP space.
Following the method proposed in Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003) we deﬁne the state
space of the Markov process by inspection of Figure 1. Every element of state space
is identiﬁed by a growth rate class and a GDP class. In particular we ﬁrst deﬁne the
growth rate classes on the basis of the average growth rate of the samples. In the
ﬁrst period the average growth rate is equal to 2.6%, while in the second period it
is equal to 0.9%. The growth rate classes are deﬁned by adding and subtracting one
percentage point. The GDP classes are deﬁned with respect to the turning points of
the growth path (for details see Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003)) and are represented by
the grid in Figure 1.8 This procedure leads to the deﬁnition of the two state spaces
in Table 1.
Log of GDP\Growth rate 1950-73 < 1.6% 1.6%,3.6% > 3.6%
Log of GDP\Growth rate 1974-97 < −0.1% −0.1%1.9% > 1.9%
0 − 6.91 I- I+ I++
6.91 − 8.29 II- II+ II++
8.29 − 9.10 III- II+ III++
> 9.10 IV- IV+ IV++
Table 1: state space deﬁnition
In Tables 2 and 3 we represent the distribution dynamics in the two periods.9
We consider the distribution in the four GDP classes in the initial and ﬁnal year,
along with the ergodic distribution.10
In Table 2 we show that in the ﬁrst period GDP class IV is an absorbing state.
Diﬀerently, in the second period (see Table 3) 48% of the countries are expected
not to catch up with the richest in the long-run, and not to cross the value of 9000
(equal to 9.10 in logs) constant dollars of per capita GDP. Hence, the Markovian
process that we are assuming governs the dynamics is not stationary across the two
8For clarity we omit the representation of the three growth rate classes. The central growth
rate class should contain relevant portions of the growth path in GDP classes I and, especially, IV.
9The distribution of observations is not symmetric, given our criterium for the choice of the
GDP classes. In particular, the distribution of observations is: 0.29, 0.48, 0.15, 0.08 (ﬁrst period);
0.19, 0.39, 0.20, 0.22 (second period).
10The transition matrices are presented in Appendix B.1. We considered 3-year transitions in
order to circumvent the possible presence of autocorrelation of growth rates due to measurement
errors.6 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
GDP I II III IV
1950 0.35 0.49 0.11 0.04
1973 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.19
Ergodic 0 0 0 1
Table 2: Distribution dynamics 1950-
1973: absolute GDP
GDP I II III IV
1973 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.19
1997 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.27
Ergodic 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.52
Table 3: Distribution dynamics 1974-
1997: absolute GDP
periods. We provide an explanation of this non-stationarity in Section 3.3, based on
cross-country interactions.
It is well-known that the discretization of the state space may aﬀect the shape
of the ergodic distribution (see Durlauf et al. (2004), pp. 57-58). In Figure 2 we
report the distribution dynamics when the state space is continuous.11
The comparison between Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3 shows that: i) the shape of
the densities in the initial and ﬁnal years conﬁrms the strong decrease in the mass
of GDP classes I and II in 1950 − 1973, which contrasts with the slight decrease in
1974−1997. This is reﬂected in the strong (weak) increase in the mass of GDP classes
III and IV in 1950 − 1973 (1974 − 1997). ii) The mass of the ergodic distribution
is almost completely concentrated in the GDP class IV in 1950 − 1973, while in
1974 − 1997 the mass in the ﬁrst three GDP classes remains noticeable.
The nonlinearity in the two periods can be appreciated from the transition ma-
trices in Appendix B.1, and from the “normalized” ergodic distribution in Table 4.12
Given that in the ﬁrst period there is an absorbing state, we represent the ergodic
distribution only for the second period.13
11The procedure to compute the ergodic distribution follows Johnson (2005)
(the author kindly helped us, by providing the instructions now available at
http://irving.vassar.edu/faculty/pj/pj.htm). The ergodic distribution solves f∞ (z) =   ∞
0 gτ (z|x)f∞ (x)dx where z and x are two GDP levels, gτ (z|x) is the density of z, given
x, τ periods ahead. In our computations we set τ = 3. To estimate gτ (z|x) it is necessary to
estimate ﬁrst the joint density of z and x, g(z,x), and then to integrate it over z to ﬁnd the
marginal density of x. In the estimation of g(z|x) we do not follow Johnson (2005) who chooses
the adaptive kernel estimator introduced by Silverman (1986), p. 100, in which the kernel window
increases when the density of observations decreases. The observations on the transitions we
analyze, which are the basis to estimate g(z|x), are often clustered, but this appears to be an
essential feature of the dynamics we are analyzing. The introduction of a variable window width
has the advantage of producing better estimates in regions where observations are sparse, but
has the drawback of oversmoothing the possible peaks generated by the clustered data. For this
reason we prefer to use a ﬁxed window width, chosen optimally as suggested by Bowman and
Azzalini (1997), p. 31. At any rate our results are not aﬀected by the use of the adaptive kernel
estimator.
12In Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003) we discuss in detail how to detect nonlinearities from the values of
a transition matrix. Brieﬂy, we take as evidence of nonlinear growth: i) a relatively high probability
to have persistently low/decreasing growth in GDP class I; ii) a relatively high probability to
have high/accelerating growth in GDP class III; and iii) a relatively high probability to have
medium/high growth in GDP class I.
13The mass in GDP class IV in the ergodic distribution of the ﬁrst period is distributed as: 0.38,
0.24, 0.38. The ergodic distribution exists even if there is an absorbing state, when it is unique.2.1 Distribution Dynamics 7






















































Figure 2: Initial, ﬁnal and ergodic distribution for the two periods (log of relative
GDP). Vertical lines refer to the GDP classes in Table 1
- + ++
I 0.40 0.25 0.36
II 0.36 0.22 0.42
III 0.35 0.16 0.49
IV 0.20 0.26 0.54
Table 4: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class
We take as evidence of nonlinearity the following facts: the probability to have
a low growth rate is relatively higher in GDP class I, decreases in GDP classes II
and III (although the values are similar), and further decreases in GDP class IV .
The relative probability of having a medium growth rate is highest in GDP class
IV (although very similar to the value in GDP class IV ), and in particular it is
higher than in GDP class III. The probability of having a very high growth rate
increases from classes I to IV . Note that there is no decrease in GDP class IV
in the fourth column, as in Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003). This can be justiﬁed if in
the long run there is positive growth as predicted by the family of AK models, and
not a monotonic decrease in the growth rate as predicted by Solovian models with
concave production functions.14
14The results of this section are conﬁrmed with data on absolute GDP per worker. See Appendix
C.8 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
2.1.2 Relative Values
In this subsection we repeat the analysis using data normalized with respect to the
world average, as is generally done in the distribution dynamics literature. This
approach has the advantage of taking into account the possible presence of a world
trend.












































Figure 3: Growth rates vs relative GDP: 1974-1997
Figure 3 conﬁrms the presence of a nonlinear growth path (as for absolute GDP,
the estimate for high and low relative GDP values is not very precise). The transition
matrices in Appendix B.2 conﬁrm the result.
The state space in this case is reported in Table 5.15
\Growth rate 1950-73 < 1.6% 1.6%,3.6% > 3.6%
Rel. GDP\Growth rate 1974-97 < −0.1% −0.1%,1.9% > 1.9%
0 − 0.18 I- I+ I++
0.18 − 0.9 II- II+ II++
0.9 − 2.1 III- II+ III++
> 2.1 IV- IV+ IV++
Table 5: state space deﬁnition
In Tables 6 and 7 we report the distribution dynamics.16
15The distribution of observations in the four classes is the following: 0.08, 0.62, 0.17, 0.13 (ﬁrst
period); 0.18, 0.48, 0.16, 0.18 (second period).
16The transition matrix and the ergodic distribution for all states are reported in Appendix B.22.1 Distribution Dynamics 9
GDP I II III IV
1950 0.07 0.67 0.15 0.11
1973 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.18
Ergodic 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.85
Table 6: Distribution dynamics 1950-
1973: relative GDP
GDP I II III IV
1973 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.18
1997 0.25 0.39 0.16 0.19
Ergodic 0.26 0.32 0.17 0.24
Table 7: Distribution dynamics 1974-
1997: relative GDP
Observe that in the ﬁrst period the initial distribution has a peak in GDP class
II. However, in 1973, the extreme classes show a substantially higher mass at the
expenses of the central classes (it can be noted that there are two peaks in GDP
classes II and IV ). We consider this as evidence of a medium-run tendency to
polarization. In particular, countries in GDP class II are growing on average faster
than countries in GDP class I but, within GDP class II, richer countries are growing
even faster. This implies that those who are growing more slowly transit to GDP
class I, as the world average is increasing over time. In the long run there is clearly
a tendency to converge to GDP class IV .17
In the second period the two peaks in the long run are in GDP classes II and IV. If
we compare the distribution in 1973 and 1997, we notice that there is a remarkable
increase in the mass of GDP class I, a decrease in GDP class II and a moderate
increase in the mass of GDP classes III and IV. In the ergodic distribution we have
two peaks in GDP classes II and IV. Hence, we observe a medium-run tendency
to polarization (although slightly diﬀerent from 1970 − 1973) which, in this case,
is reﬂected by a long-run tendency to polarization.18 In Figure 4 we compare the
initial, ﬁnal and ergodic distributions without discretazing the state space.
The dynamics represented in Tables 6 and 7 is conﬁrmed in Figure 4. The
comparison between the distribution of the initial and ﬁnal year shows that in both
subperiods we have a medium-run tendency to polarization, that is an increase of
the mass in the tails and a decrease in the intermediate GDP range. However, the
long-run distribution shows a clear tendency to polarization only in 1974 − 1997,
while in 1950−1973 a strong peak emerges at high GDP levels (but notice the mass
remaining at lower GDP levels).
The same distribution dynamics appears when GDP is normalized with respect
to the US GDP (see Appendix B.3). In Table 26 we observe a tendency for 50% of
countries to converge in 1950 − 1973 to GDP class IV , which refers to GDP levels
greater than 65% of US GDP. In Table 29, instead, we observe in 1974 − 1997 a
tendency for 61% of countries to converge to GDP class I, which refers to GDP
17It is not completely meaningful that almost all countries converge to a GDP level which is
more than twice the average of the sample. This is an example of the limits of using this type of
normalization highlighted by Kremer et al. (2001). However, if we normalize GDP with respect
to US GDP these tendencies are broadly conﬁrmed (see Appendix B.3).
18The fact that we are not observing two peaks in the extreme classes, as in Quah (1997), is
likely to depend on the discretization. For instance, if we set the limit of GDP class I to 0.25 we
would obtain an ergodic distribution with two peaks in GDP classes I and IV.10 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS






















































Figure 4: Initial, ﬁnal and ergodic distribution for the two periods (relative per
capita GDP). Vertical lines refer to the GDP classes in Table 5
levels lower than 5% of US GDP. This is a clear conﬁrmation of the worsening of the
relative position of a large number of countries in the second period with respect to
the technological leaders. This tendency is conﬁrmed with a continuous GDP space
in Figure 18. When we consider per worker GDP, we ﬁnd the same shape of the
ergodic distribution in 1974−1997, but the two peaks are in GDP classes I and III
(see Table 44).
In Tables 8 and 9 we report the normalized ergodic distributions for the two pe-
riods. Both broadly conﬁrm the presence of nonlinearities along the lines suggested
in the previous section.
- + ++
I 0.47 0.32 0.21
II 0.43 0.23 0.34
III 0.22 0.18 0.60
IV 0.34 0.25 0.41
Table 8: ergodic distribution normal-
ized for each GDP class. 1950-73
- + ++
I 0.39 0.26 0.35
II 0.35 0.20 0.44
III 0.31 0.14 0.55
IV 0.19 0.29 0.52
Table 9: ergodic distribution normal-
ized for each GDP class. 1974-97
2.1.3 Summmary of the Empirical Analysis
In general, our ﬁndings are not consistent with the idea that the productivity slow-
down aﬀected in particular countries on the technological frontier, with a smaller
impact on countries far away from it. In 1950 − 1973, 5 out of 122 countries had a
negative average annual growth rate. In 1974−1997 the number raised to 35: almost
all are African countries, some South American countries and some oil producers.2.2 Investment and Growth 11
It seems that many of the countries more severely aﬀected by the slowdown were
poor countries, which moved from positive to negative growth rates, a particularly
clear result when we observe the dynamics of absolute GDP.
With relative GDP, the cross-country dynamics in 1950−1973 is compatible with
the Lucas (2000)’s model, in which growth in the aggregate is nonlinear, inequality
across countries increases in the medium run but tends to disappear in the long
run. In that model, this type of dynamics is generated by a process of technological
spillovers between countries: countries starting the growth process late can beneﬁt
from the technology developed by the leading countries, and therefore have an ini-
tial strong increase in growth, which is stronger the further a country is from the
technological leader, that subsequently slows down.19
Models where relative backwardness is an advantage, in particular because it
allows to exploit the technology developed by richer countries, fail to explain the
dynamics of the second period. In such models, growth for poor countries should
not be aﬀected by the slowdown in the long run, as the growth mechanism they
propose should not prevent all countries to converge to the highest GDP levels.
In Section 3 we provide a more detailed analysis of the relation of our results with
existing theoretical models, and propose a new model to accont for the the empirical
evidence of this section.
2.2 Investment and Growth
Before proceeding, we consider the following question: is the productivity slowdown
related to investment rates? The Solow theory suggests that a reduction in the
saving rate reduces the growth rate in the short run, while a simple AK model
predicts that the reduction should also extend to the long run. As Fischer (1988), p.
4, puts it, a decline in the rate of investment is a “suspect” in the search for the
causes of productivity slowdown. We consider a restricted sample for which we can
obtain data on investment rates (measured by the ratio of investment to GDP) from
the Penn World Table 6.1. The restricted sample includes 91 countries for the period
1962 − 1997.20
In Figure 5 we plot a nonparametric estimation of the relation between invest-
ment rates and the growth rate of GDP for the two periods.21
19Taken literally, in Lucas’ model countries are completely stagnant until they begin to grow,
by exploiting the international spillovers of technology. Our empirical results show that in the
ﬁrst period many poor countries have a low, but positive, growth rate. This can reﬂect the
presence of internal sources of growth, which allow a country to grow while it is “waiting” for
the spillovers. However, using data in relative terms does not allow to verify empirically some
important predictions of the Lucas’ model such as that, sooner or later, all countries start to grow.
20See Appendix A for the country list.
21The criterium used for these estimates is the same of the ﬁgures in Section 2. Here we used
4-year averages to reduce the inﬂuence of cyclical factors.12 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
































Figure 5: Growth rates vs investment ratio (four-year averages).
We can observe that in both periods the relation is positive, although character-
ized by some nonlinearities (the estimates for high values of the investment ratio are
not very precise). What is striking is that the estimate for the ﬁrst period lies above
that of the second period and the vertical distance is nearly constant.22 Hence, we
argue that an exhaustive explanation for the slowdown in growth rates cannot be
found in changes in rates of accumulation.
In fact, the growth rate increases with the level of the investment rate in both
periods but in the second period the same level of investment share is invariably
associated to a remarkably lower growth rate of per capita GDP. This means that
something else must have reduced the growth rate in the second period rather than a
reduction in investment rates. This result contrasts with Hamilton and Monteagudo
(1998). They study the slowdown in the neoclassical framework and ﬁnd a positive
coeﬃcient of the variation of investment on the variation of growth rate across two
periods, before and after the oil shock. Their ﬁnding is however explainable by a
downward shift of the growth-investment relation, as shown in Figure 5, and not by
a movement on the same curve, as implied by their analysis.
This is further demonstrated in Table 10. We sort the 91 countries in two groups:
those who decreased the average investment rate s over the two periods: 1962−1973
and 1974 − 1997, and those who increased it.
22Following Bowman and Azzalini (1997), p. 123, we tested the null hypothesis that the two
regression curves are parallel . We cannot reject the null hypothesis at 14% conﬁdence level.2.2 Investment and Growth 13
GDP 1962 GDP 1974 s1 s2 g1 g2
∆s < 0 (48 countries) 1.30 (8.34) 1.30 (8.75) 22.90% 18.19% 3.05% 0.9%
∆s > 0 (43 countries) 0.67 (7.68) 0.66 (8.08) 11.12% 14.60% 3.02% 1.7%
Table 10: Investment ratios and growth rates: relative and log absolute (in paren-
thesis) per capita GDP
For both groups of countries we report in Table 10: the average GDP in the ﬁrst
year of both periods (respectively, 1961 and 1974); the average investment share
over the ﬁrst and the second period (s1 and s2); the average yearly annual growth
rate over the two periods (g1 and g2).
Both groups of countries saw a remarkable decrease in the growth rate in the
second period, despite the fact that a group of countries considerably increased the
investment share. Countries that decreased the rate of investment were on average
richer than those who increased it.
We can represent this piece of evidence in a more detailed fashion, by partitioning
the countries according to our GDP state space. In particular, we partition the
observations in 1973, and relate them to the average investment rates in the ﬁrst
and in the second period.
GDP (relative) s1 s2 ∆s g1 g2 ∆g




1.17 0.4% 1% +0.6%




−0.08 2.8% 1% −1.8%




−2.2 4.4% 1.5% −2.9%









−0.87 2.9% 1.2% −1.7%
Table 11: Investment shares and growth rates: countries partitioned in (relative)
GDP classes
GDP (absolute) s1 s2 ∆s g1 g2 ∆g




1.05 1.2% 0.7% −0.5%




0.68 2.7% 1.1% −1.6%




−2.45 4.3% 1.4% −2.9%









−0.87 2.9% 1.2% −1.7%
Table 12: Investment shares and growth rates: countries partitioned in (absolute)
GDP classes14 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
Tables 11 and 12 show that the decrease in the investment rate aﬀected the
countries diﬀerently according to their GDP level (standard deviations are in paren-
theses). Results are comparable with relative and absolute GDP observations. In
both cases countries in GDP classes III and IV strongly decreased the investment
share, while countries in GDP class I increased it (with relative GDP these countries
slightly increased their growth rate). Data for countries in GDP class II show little
change. From Tables 11 and 12 we also see that there is a positive relation between
the level of GDP and the level of the investment rate.23
Overall, we argue that the growth slowdown cannot be entirely reconducted to a
generalized decrease in the rate of accumulation although, as we discuss below, the
strong decrease in the investment rate in rich countries may have played a role.
3 Alternative Frameworks: Theory and Empiri-
cal Evidence
In this section we relate our empirical results to diﬀerent theoretical frameworks. In
particular we ﬁrst discuss two growth models with Solovian accumulation equations,
and then introduce positive (“appropriate”) and negative technological spillovers as
an additional feature to understand the causes of the slowdown.
3.1 Exogenous Technological Progress







− (δ + n + γ), (1)
where s is the saving rate, κ = k/A is the capital stock in eﬃciency units (k = K/L
is the per capita capital and A is the level of exogenous technological progress), δ the
rate of depreciation of capital, n the growth rate of population and γ the exogenous
growth rate of technological progress.
Standard assumptions on technology are that f′ > 0 and f′′ < 0, plus the Inada
conditions: limk→0 f′ = ∞ and limk→∞ f′ = 0. In the long-run equilibrium all per
capita variables grow at the constant rate γ.
Countries with diﬀerent parameters should nonetheless grow in the long run at
the same rate γ. In a model with exogenous technological progress the average
growth rate of per capita GDP of the sample over the period can be considered
as a (rough) estimate of the exogenous growth rate of technological progress γ.
23This does not depend on the discretization of data on GDP into classes. A nonparametric
regression of investment rates against GDP levels conﬁrms this result.
24In this and in the following sections we assume that s is constant. However, as we showed,
the investment rate is increasing in GDP. Therefore, a more precise speciﬁcation should consider
s = s(k), with s′ > 0. For simplicity we abstract from this point, which, in any case, would
strengthen the nonlinearity of the growth path that we introduce below.3.1 Exogenous Technological Progress 15
Therefore γ should have decreased from 2.6% to 0.9%. The empirical predictions of
a Solow model with a concave production function and cross-country parameters’
heterogeneity would be: convergence to the highest absolute GDP class in both
periods, convergence to diﬀerent relative GDP classes in both periods.
Even taking into account cross-country heterogeneity and the implied tendency
for conditional convergence, the standard Solow growth model with a concave pro-
duction function represented by Eq. (1) is not appropriate to explain our empirical
results for the following reasons:25
1. the nonlinearity of the growth path excludes that countries are characterized
by concave production functions with diﬀerent parameters.26
2. In the ﬁrst period, data in relative terms show a tendency for basically all
countries to converge to the same GDP class. If cross-country heterogeneity
were present, it would be in this case suﬃciently weak not to impede this type
of dynamics. On the contrary, in the second period convergence is expected
to occur in diﬀerent GDP classes. Then two cases are possible: i) convergence
to diﬀerent classes depends on of nonlinearity and not on heterogeneity; ii)
heterogeneity characterizes only the period after 1973, and hence the shock
aﬀected individual countries’ γ asymmetrically and, therefore, the hypothe-
sis of a common exogenous technological progress in both periods would be
misplaced. Alternatively, countries became heterogeneous in some of the pa-
rameters. At any rate, in this case we need a theory explaining why countries
appeared as essentially homogeneous before the shock and heterogeneous after
the shock.
3. In the second period a poverty trap in absolute terms appears, i.e. a relevant
fraction of countries is not expected to reach the highest GDP class in the
long run. This is at odds with the crucial empirical implication of the con-
ditional convergence hypothesis, according to which all countries in the long
run are expected to grow at the same long-run growth rate, determined by the
exogenous rate of technological progress γ.
The next step consists in considering a growth model which preserves the Solov-
ian accumulation equation with exogenous technological progress, but in which
f (κ)/κ is nonlinear in κ. In particular we assume that f (κ)/κ is ﬁrst decreasing,
then increasing and ﬁnally decreasing in κ, with limκ→0f′ = ∞ an limκ→∞f′ = 0.27
25The Solovian framework, where capital accumulation depends only on the capital stock of the
previous period, corresponds to a ﬁrst-order Markov process for GDP. The joint consideration of
GDP and growth rate as state variables does not change the Markovian nature of the estimated
process.
26In Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003) we control for cross-country heterogeneity in a similar sample
and reject the hypothesis of conditional convergence.
27A longer discussion on this type of function is in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 74-77.
The introduction of this possibility goes back to the original Solow 1956 model (see in particular
p. 71). The other two cases of nonlinear growth discussed by Solow are a nonconstant saving rate
and a nonconstant population growth rate.16 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
The nonlinear path can be due to the existence of an intermediate level of capital
characterized by increasing returns to scale. This assumption is justiﬁed by a large
literature which goes from the classical contributions of Lewis (1956) and Rostow
(1960) to Murphy et al. (1989) and Peretto (1999), which highlight structural
change in the growth process as a cause for this pattern. Structural change consists
in a transformation of the economy such that the weight of traditional sectors (e.g.
agriculture) declines, and the weight of industrial sectors increases.
In order to obtain the dynamics of the ﬁrst period, we should have a nonlinear
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Figure 7: Nonlinear Solovian model:
case B
In the ﬁrst case (Figure 6) all countries converge to ¯ κ1. In steady state all
countries grow (in per capita terms) at the common rate γ1. If we proxy the long-
run growth rate by a simple average of the sample over a period of time, then we
conclude that it is decreased in the second period (as noted, from 2.6% to 0.9%).
Hence, the horizontal line in Figure 6 should shift down. This would produce a
tendency to converge to the same capital level (in eﬃciency units) ¯ κ2. All countries
would still be expected to grow in the long run (in per capita terms) at the common
growth rate γ2 < γ1. This implication does not ﬁnd support in the data, as in the
second period we observe polarization in relative terms: with polarization, countries
may well be described as growing at the same rate in the long run, maintaining a
diﬀerence in GDP levels.
In Figure 7 we represent another case. Here all countries are still expected to
converge to the same capital level (in eﬃciency units) ¯ κ1, and to grow in the long
run at the exogenous growth rate γ1. The decrease in γ in this case is compatible
with the evidence in the second period, where countries polarize at diﬀerent relative3.2 A Nonlinear Endogenous Growth Model 17
GDP levels.
We see in Figure 7 that a decrease in γ from γ1 to γ2 generates three equilibria:
a stable “low” equilibrium ¯ κL, a stable “high” equilibrium ¯ κH, and an unstable
equilibrium, ¯ κU. However, this picture is not compatible with the evidence for
the ﬁrst period. There, we observed in relative terms a medium-run tendency to
polarization, with increasing fractions of countries in GDP classes I and IV and
decreasing fractions in GDP classes II and III. In Figure 7 poor countries, that is
those starting from a GDP level lower than ¯ κ1, have the highest growth rates in the
transition. In particular their growth rate is higher than the long-run growth rate
γ1. Countries starting from per capita GDP levels higher than ¯ κ1 have instead lower
growth rates in per capita terms, in particular growth rates lower than γ1 (these
growth rates may even be negative). These countries should display a tendency
to converge to equilibrium by jumping from the higher GDP classes to the lower.
Therefore we should not observe polarization in the medium run, but a tendency to
converge to GDP class I.
3.2 A Nonlinear Endogenous Growth Model
Given that nonlinearities are a salient feature of the overall picture, consider the
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where f (k,B)/k is nonlinear in k (the capital stock should be interpreted as a
composite index of physical and human capital). In particular we assume that
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, with limk→0f′ = ∞ and limk→∞ f′ = B
(see Figure 8). We assume that B > (δ + n)/s, which is a necessary condition to
have growth in the long run, since the long-run growth rate g is equal to sB −
(δ + n) > 0.
The parameter B indexes the level of productivity of k, i.e. ∂f (k,B)/∂B > 0
(see Galor (1996), p. 1067). It is straightforward to prove that sf (k,B)/k < δ + n
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition to have a low-income stable equilibrium (see
Figure 8. The introduction of the parameter B is a convenient way to represent in
this framework multifactor productivity, another variable often quoted as responsible
for the slowdown.28 The productivity slowdown could therefore be represented as a
reduction in B.
28See e.g. Baily and Schultze (1990) on the United States. In growth accounting exercises, the
growth of output over a speciﬁed period is expressed as a weighted sum of growth rates of capital
and labour and of multifactor productivity, taken as a proxy of exogenous technological progress in
the Solovian framework. An estimate of multifactor productivity is provided by the residual after
deducting the weighted growth rates of capital and labor from the growth rate of output. Weights
are the factor shares in national GDP, under the hypothesis of perfect competition.18 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
The growth path generated by Eq. (2) displays an AK dynamics, but only for
a high level of capital.29 In general, a downward shift of the growth path, and a
consequent decrease in the long-run growth rate, may be caused by four factors: (i)
a decrease in s; (ii) an increase in the growth rate of population n; iii) a decrease in
B and iv) an increase in the rate of depreciation of capital δ.
In Section 2.2 we found that variations in s have an ambiguous eﬀect on growth
rates after 1973. Moreover, we observe that the growth rate of population appears
almost constant in the two periods (2.3% vs 2.0% in our restricted sample for re-
spectively the ﬁrst and the second period).30 This is not surprising because, with
the exception of very unlikely events, the growth rate of population follows a smooth
path (in addition, the oil shock is diﬃcult to be reconciled with a possible change
in population dynamics). This excludes another potential explanatory factor of the
decrease in the growth rate, which is generally found signiﬁcantly inversely related
to growth.31 In the rest of this section we concentrate on the eﬀects of a change in
productivity measured by B and in δ.
3.2.1 A Decrease in Factor Productivity
A decrease in total factor productivity strongly characterizes the productivity slow-
down after 1973, as remarked among others by Baily and Schultze (1990) and Fischer
(1988). In the framework without exogenous technological progress but with em-
bodied technological change, this phenomenon is represented by a decrease in B.32
Figure 8 reports a graphical representation of the possible dynamics in the two
periods.
In Figure 8, ˙ k/k is measured by the vertical distance between the curve sf (k,B)/k
and the straight line representing n+δ. In the ﬁrst period productivity is suﬃciently
high that sf (k,B1)/k is always above n+ δ: all countries independent of their ini-
tial levels of capital grow at a positive rate in the long run. The resulting growth
pattern is compatible with our empirical results: in particular with the estimate of
the growth paths for 1950 − 1973 in Figures 1 and 3.33
29The AK model has been criticized on the grounds of results on conditional convergence (see
e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 167). However, if the growth path is nonlinear in the
transition, the evidence on conditional convergence may not be suﬃcient to reject the AK model.
In fact, with a nonlinear path, countries in the sample may display a period of convergence, in
which poor countries grow faster than rich countries. The problem in this case would consist
in discerning between a “nonlinear AK model” with a model which is asymptotically AK, but
satisﬁes the neoclassical assumptions otherwise ( Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 226). To the
best of our knowledge, an empirical test of a nonlinear AK model has not been provided yet.
30Data on population are from PWT 6.1.
31 Romer (1990) ﬁnds a negative long-run relation between the growth rate of the labour force
and the growth rate of productivity.
32A related literature emphasizes that the 60s witnessed a reduction in inventive activity, which
may have been reﬂected in the slowdown of productivity in the 70s (see Fischer (1988) and the
references therein.).
33The nonlinearity of the dynamics of per capita capital is reﬂected in the dynamics of per capita
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Figure 8: Nonlinear endogenous growth model: the eﬀect of a decrease in the pro-
ductivity parameter B
First we observe that, in the transition, some rich countries can grow faster
than poor ones. This dynamics is compatible with the medium-run polarization
in the relative data observed in the ﬁrst period (compare the GDP distributions
for 1950 and 1973 in Table 6), and with the tendency of all countries to converge
to the highest absolute and relative GDP classes in the long run (see the ergodic
distributions in Tables 2 and 6 but recall the remark on convergence to the same
relative GDP class in footnote 17).
A productivity slowdown caused by a decrease in B from B1 to B2 determines a
downward shift of the sf(k,B)/k curve and a lower growth rate for any level of k. A
suﬃciently high reduction of B leads to the appearance of multiple equilibria, more
precisely it must be true that sf (k,B2)/k < δ + n. In particular in Figure 8 we
have two equilibria: kL is a stable equilibrium, while kU is unstable. All countries
with capital lower than kU will converge to kL. Otherwise, countries with an initial
capital higher than kU will have positive growth in the long run (but lower than the
previous period). We deﬁne a phenomenon in which a country persistently stays in
kL as a poverty trap.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence in absolute values (see Table 3): a
relevant fraction of countries appears unable to reach the highest GDP class, neither
in the medium run (in 1997), nor in the long-run limit (the ergodic distribution).
In 1973 20% of the sample was in GDP class I, in 1997 this share was still 20%:
this is compatible with the appearance of a stable low-income equilibrium in the
and Lavezzi (2003)).20 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
post-shock period. In the ergodic limit of the second period, 10% of countries are
still in GDP class I (and 19% are in GDP class II, which should contain part of the
basin of attraction of kL.
This is also compatible with the evidence in relative terms (see Table 7): in the
second period in fact we observe a marked tendency to polarization both in the
medium and in the long run. In particular, notice that the mass in GDP class II
has been reducing clearly since 1973, while the mass in GDP classes I and III is
increased. This agrees with the appearance of an unstable equilibrium in GDP class
II. In the same period, the mass in GDP class I has increased remarkably both in
the medium run and in the ergodic limit; this conﬁrms the emergence of a stable
equilibrium in GDP class I.
We will show that, in the period after 1973, B decreased in particular for the
poorest and richest countries. An explanation of why B decreased and remained
permanently lower, making a transitory phenomenon like the oil shock exert per-
sistent eﬀects, is addressed in Section 3.3, where we argue that the reason can be
found in the dynamics of international technological spillovers.
3.2.2 An Increase in the Rate of Depreciation
Baily and Schultze (1990), p. 397, argue that the rate of obsolescence of capital δ
may have increased suddenly as a consequence of the oil shock. A change in the rel-
ative price of factors like the price of energy can make installed capital economically
obsolete, and the capital services may be reduced. Then, even if the investment
rate is not changing, the growth rates of GDP per capita and productivity decrease
because part of the new capital must be devoted to restoring the eﬃcient allocation
of capital among sectors, when installed capital is largely speciﬁc.
In Figure 8 the eﬀect of higher δ can represented by an upward shift of the
straight line. The empirical implications are the same of a decrease in B. However,
it is not clear that δ has remained permanently to its higher post-shock level for the
whole second period (see Baily and Schultze (1990)).
In the next section we argue that a transitory change in δ had a permanent eﬀect
on growth because it aﬀected the evolution of the world income distribution and the
international ﬂow of technologies.
3.3 A Nonlinear Endogenous Growth Model with Techno-
logical Spillovers
Further insights on the productivity slowdown can be gained from a nonlinear growth
model with technological spillovers between countries. The models discussed so far
do not explicitly rule them out. Spillovers may be present in both the case of
exogenous technological progress, which implies that technology may freely move
across countries, and the case of endogenous technological change, when parameter
B may depend on the spillovers. In this section we concentrate on this second case
and suggest to utilize a diﬀerent perspective on technological transfers, namely the3.3 A Nonlinear Endogenous Growth Model with Technological Spillovers 21
one advanced by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and more recently by Basu and Weil
(1998), based on the concept of appropriate technology (we have already discussed
the drawbacks of models such as Lucas (2000)). According to this view, technological
progress is “local”, as it aﬀects only some combinations of the capital/labour ratio
and not the entire production function.
This implies that technology can be transferred across “similar” countries, in the
sense that they must have similar capital/labour ratios. Moreover, two countries
may reciprocally beneﬁt from their proximity in terms of capital/labour ratios. The
relevance of economic proximity suggests that the distribution dynamics approach,
explicitly focused on the economic distance between countries (in particular in terms
of per capita GDP), can be proper to understand the eﬀects and the causes of the
productivity slowdown. The presence of polarization in the Lucas’ model has no
eﬀects in the long run, as transitory polarization does not preclude poor countries
to grow and catch up with the richest. On the contrary, if the transfer of technologies
occurs in the way described by Basu and Weil (1998), polarization in the medium
run may have an eﬀect in the long run, as countries lagging behind become unable
to exploit the technologies developed in advanced countries.
However, in Basu and Weil (1998) the production technology is basically AK,
even if the growth rate of a country also depends on the interactions with other
countries. This implies that poor countries that increase their investment rate when
richer countries decrease it, should increase their growth rate in the steady state.34
We have observed in Tables 11 and 12, in a comparison between the two periods,
that only countries in GDP class I signiﬁcantly increased their investment rate,
countries in GDP class II show little variations, while countries in GDP classes III
and IV show a remarkable decrease. Nonetheless, the growth rate for poor countries
has decreased in the second period with absolute GDP and slightly increased with
relative GDP, but remains the lowest with respect to the growth rate for the other
GDP classes.
Diﬀerently from Basu and Weil (1998), in a nonlinear growth model it is possible
that poor countries increase their saving rate but their long run growth rate remains
ﬁxed at zero. This happens when the increase in the saving rate is not suﬃcient to
allow a country to escape the poverty trap.
In addition, in a model with nonlinearities and “appropriate” international tech-
nological transfers, it is possible that temporary shocks on parameters such as δ and
B may have permanent eﬀects. In particular, if a process of technological transfers
was at work before the oil shock, the shock could have temporarily increased the
distances between countries, causing an interruption in the ﬂow of technologies from
rich countries to poor ones.
As we will discuss, a model with technological spillovers can help to understand
also the marked decrease in the growth rates of rich countries in the second period,
34There exists a case in which poor countries that increase the saving rate do not increase the
growth rate: the case in which richer countries increase their saving rate faster. This implies that
poor countries stop beneﬁting from the technological spillovers from richer countries, and the net
eﬀect on their growth rate is negative.22 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
which can be only partially explained by the decrease in their investment rate: in
fact, the magnitude of the decrease in the latter appears to be too small (approx-
imately from 29% to 25%) to explain why rich countries have more than halved
their growth rate after the oil shock (from 3.6% - 3.5% to 1.6%). In particular,
as suggested by Goodfriend and McDermott (1998), richer countries may have re-
ceived negative spillovers (to be deﬁned below) from other countries in the process
of catching-up.
3.3.1 The Model
The model in Section 3.2 can be extended to provide insights of the eﬀects of tech-







− (δ + n), (3)
where Bi represents an index of knowledge available to country i. We suppose that






















ing the relative level of knowledge of each country with respect to the knowledge of
country i (N > 1 is the total number of countries).
In the endogenous growth literature it is common to consider per capita capital
as a proxy for the level of knowledge accumulated in a country (see Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004)), so that the vector of relative knowledge for country i becomes:















Function m should reﬂect two crucial properties of models with technological
spillovers and limited appropriability of technology: (i) a follower gains from a
technological leader more than the other way around and, (ii) following Basu and
Weil (1998), technological spillovers are eﬀective only for similar economies, i.e. with
similar k. Accordingly, we assume that:
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In Eq. (5) we are assuming that both follower and leader countries are reciprocally
aﬀected by technological spillovers. This means that 1+¯ aH deﬁnes the range of the
relative capital of the more advanced countries which are beneﬁcial for country i.
On the contrary, 1 − ¯ aL identiﬁes the range of countries with a capital lower than
i that have a negative eﬀect on country i’s productivity. Notice that each term
kj/ki < 1 decreases Bi with respect to the case in which country i is not aﬀected by
technological transfers.35
Here we follow the intuition of Goodfriend and McDermott (1998). In their
model productivity increases from two sources: (i) learning by doing generated by
the local production of intermediate goods and (ii) technological transfers by import
of intermediate goods. Imitative activity of laggards, which allows them to produce
intermediate goods previously imported from leader countries, decreases the growth
rate of productivity of the latter by reducing their accumulation of knowledge.36
Parameter β > 1 measures the advantage of the follower in beneﬁting from the ﬂow
of knowledge of more advanced countries.
A higher β means higher beneﬁts, but it also measures the disadvantages of
the leader form the presence of followers. This hypothesis diﬀers from Basu and
Weil (1998), where a country beneﬁts from both leaders and followers if their capi-
tal/labour ration falls within a certain range.37 Finally, if all countries in Zi share
the same level of capital it is straightforward to check from (4) that Bi =  .38
The most favourable case for country i occurs when all countries N are in Zi
and N − 1 countries have a level of k equal to ki
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which is increasing in N and converges to  
 
1 + ¯ aH β for N → ∞.
35Country i is not aﬀected by technological spillovers if Zi = {i}. In this case Bi = µ.
36In addition, standard international economics suggests that the process of catching up by
laggard countries may hurt leading countries’ growth because it worsens their terms of trade (see,
e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld (2004), Ch. 5). We thank Alberto Chilosi for pointing out this to us.























38This is another diﬀerence with respect to Basu and Weil (1998), where the cardinality of Zi
matters. That is, if all countries in Zi are identical, an increase in |Zi| increases productivity of
country i. This eﬀect can be easily obtained by raising |Zi| in Eq. (4) to an exponent lower than
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The worst case for country i is when it is the leader country and all the other
countries are on the limit of lower range, that is:
  Ai =
 
1 − ¯ a





Bi =  
(N − 1)
 
1 − ¯ aL β + 1
N
,
which is decreasing in N and converges to  
 
1 − ¯ aL β for N → ∞.
In order to match the empirical results we impose the following two conditions:
1. Possibility of positive long-run growth:
s 
 
1 − ¯ a
L β
> δ + n; (6)
2. Possible existence of a poverty trap:
∃¯ kL,¯ kU : s
f (k, )
k
= δ + n for k = ¯ kL,¯ kU; (7)
Condition (6) states that the leader country can grow at a positive rate even in
the worst case (remember that limki−→∞ ˙ ki/ki = sBi−(δ + n)). Condition (7) states
that a country which does not beneﬁt from technological transfers, in the sense that
no countries are in Zi and therefore B =  , is absorbed into a poverty trap if its
capital is lower than ¯ kU (Figure 16 is a reference for the present discussion).
In addition, let Bmin >   be the minimum level of productivity for which a






= δ + n. (8)
We notice that Bmin positively depends on δ and n and negatively on s.
In general, an analytical characterization of this model is diﬃcult for the joint
eﬀect on the growth path of a country of nonlinearities and interactions with other
countries. In this framework shocks can aﬀect the qualitative nature of the overall
dynamics (i.e. they can generate a poverty trap).
To have an intuition of the possible types of dynamics consider a world with
two economies: a poor country P with initial capital k0
P, and a rich country R with
initial capital k0
R. If k0
P < ¯ kU < k0
R and there are no technological spillovers (i.e.
BP = BR =   < Bmin) then kt
P converges to ¯ kL, while kt
R grows indeﬁnitely (i.e.
country P falls into a poverty trap). The presence of technological spillovers could
increase BP above Bmin, and allow country P to escape the poverty trap or, more
generally, the eﬀect of technological spillovers could last enough to bring kP above
¯ kU. In more formal terms:3.3 A Nonlinear Endogenous Growth Model with Technological Spillovers 25
Proposition 1 Consider a two-country world and let k0
P < k0
R be the initial levels
of capital for the two countries. Assume that: (i) conditions (6) and (7) hold; (ii)
¯ aH > ¯ aL and (iii) ¯ kU > ¯ kL
 
1 + ¯ aH 
. If k0
P < ¯ kU < k0
R then a poverty trap exists,
i.e. limt→∞ kt
P = ¯ kL, and limt→∞ kt
R = +∞, if and only if
∃T : k
T
P < ¯ kU <
kT
R
1 + ¯ aH. (9)
Proof. First we prove that if ∃T : kT
P < ¯ kU <
kT
R
1+¯ aH then limt→∞ kt
P = ¯ kL and
limt→∞ kt
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∀t ≥ T. ii)
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: then ˙ kt
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P < 0 until kt
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and then ˙ kt
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∀t ≥ T. This concludes the ﬁrst part of the proof. Now we
prove that, if limt→∞ kt
P = ¯ kL and limt→∞ kt
R = +∞, then ∃T : kT




The proof is straightforward: we observe that the relationship ¯ kL < ¯ kU < +∞
corresponds to the relationship kT
P < ¯ kU <
kT
R
1+¯ aH when T tends to inﬁnity. QED
Proposition 1 states that, when countries interact, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for country P to be in a poverty trap is that, given the initial capital
levels, there exists a time T in which country P is in the basin of attraction of ¯ kL
and can not beneﬁt from technological spillovers from country R. Therefore, even
if at the beginning country P could beneﬁt from positive spillovers from country
R, this may not be suﬃcient to allow country P to escape a poverty trap. This
is due to nonlinearities, which can cause country R to grow faster than country P
notwithstanding the positive externalities accruing in the initial period to country
P.39
On the contrary, kP may be initially on the left of ¯ kU, but the negative eﬀect
due to the nonlinearity can be outweighed by the positive eﬀect of the spillovers,
that is the actual path of P can be lifted suﬃciently above the growth path which
would be followed were technological transfers absent. From Proposition 1 it directly
derives that if k0
P < ¯ kU < k0
R/
 
1 + ¯ aH 
, i.e. ZP = {P} (and ZR = {R}), then a
poverty trap exists; but also that if k0
P < ¯ kU and k0




1 + ¯ aH 
, i.e.
ZP = {P,R} (and ZR = {R}), then a poverty trap may not exist.40 Therefore, the
threshold of capital which leads into a poverty trap could be lower than ¯ kU. This
threshold is implicitly deﬁned as:41
k
0






P : ∃T : k
T
P ≤ ¯ kU <
kT
R
1 + ¯ aH
 
, (10)
39For simplicity, in the present discussion the hypothesis ¯ aH > ¯ aL is assumed to guarantee that
when P receives positive spillovers from R, R does not receive negative spillovers from P.
40For example consider the initial conditions k0
R > ¯ kU > k0
P when k0
P = ¯ kU −ε and k0
R = ¯ kU +ε,
with ε > 0 but small and ¯ aH suﬃciently high to have ZP = {P,R} and ¯ aL suﬃciently low to have
ZR = {R}.
41We include also k0




P then also country P grows in the long run.
The previous analysis should help to understand how negative shocks can have
a long-run eﬀect in a context of cross-country interactions. Consider an economy
with initial capital k
0
P < k0
P < ¯ kU < k0
R, which implies the non-existence of poverty
traps. A suﬃcient increase in the depreciation rate δ can create the conditions for
a negative growth rate of country P (i.e. BP < Bmin after the shock) and this can
lead kP below the threshold k
0
P. Therefore, even if δ returns to its previous value
in a subsequent period, country P can nonetheless remain in the basin of attraction
of ¯ kL. In other words, a negative shock can deprive country P of positive spillovers
by increasing its distance from country R, pushing the poor country into a poverty
trap.
3.4 Empirical Evidence on Distribution Dynamics and Tech-
nological Spillovers
In order to discuss the empirical implications of the model we divide every period
into two subperiods of the same length (12 years). Figures 9 and 11 compare the
estimates of the growth path of four subperiods: 1950−1961, 1962−1973, 1974−1985,
1986 − 1997.42 Figures 10 and 12 compare the density estimations of the sample
income distribution in 1950 and in the ﬁnal year of each subsample: 1961, 1973,
1985 and 1997. In the ﬁgures that follow the thinnest line refers to the ﬁrst period
or ﬁrst year considered, the thickest to the last. Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 also report
the boundaries of the GDP classes we introduced in the previous sections.
In Figure 9 we observe that, for relative GDP, all the growth paths display an
increasing part which ends with a peak in GDP class III (a partial exception is the
growth path in 1974−1985, which becomes rather ﬂat after reaching a peak in GDP
class II). This is less evident for the log of GDP, in which the peak is in GDP class
II or III in 1950 − 1961, 1962 − 1973 and 1973 − 1985 and moves into GDP class
IV in 1986 − 1997 (see Figure 11). It is remarkable that in 1986 − 1997 the path
shifts upwards in the highest GDP classes, becoming more similar to the paths of
the ﬁrst two subperiods. We take this as indicating that some of the causes of the
slowdown had been removed in 1986 − 1997.
The evolution of the world income distribution displays the following features:
in relative terms, the distribution becomes twin-peaked over time (see Figure 10).
Note that in 1973 there is some evidence of an increase in the peak in GDP class
IV , which becomes very clear in 1985 and 1997. The distribution of the log of GDP
initially shows a decrease in the masses of GDP classes I and in the ﬁrst part of
GDP class II in the ﬁrst two periods, coupled with an increase in the mass in the
42These nonparametric regression are obtained with R (2005), in particular with the statistical
package sm, see Bowman and Azzalini (1997b). Given the smaller number of observations for every
regression, we adopted the adaptive kernel procedure of Silverman (1986), where the bandwidth
increases as the density of observations decreases (the parameter regulating the sensitivity of the
window width to the density of observations is set to 0.5). For the pilot estimate of the densities
of observations we used the optimal normal bandwidth with gaussian kernel.3.4 Empirical Evidence on Distribution Dynamics and Technological Spillovers 27

































Figure 9: Estimate of growth path
for four subperiods (relative per capita
GDP)









































Figure 10: Estimate of density for rel-
ative per capita GDP in ﬁve selected
years

































Figure 11: Estimate of growth path for
four subperiods (log of per capita GDP)
































Figure 12: Estimate of density for log
of per capita GDP in ﬁve selected years28 3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
second part of GDP classes II and GDP classes III and IV (compare 1950 vs 1961
and, especially, 1961 vs 1973). After 1973 the tendency for reduction in the mass in
GDP class I slows down, and remains more evident in GDP class II. At the same
time, in 1973 there is a more visible increase of the mass in GDP class IV , which
subsequently increases slowly. Note that, between 1985 and 1997, the mass in GDP
class III decreases and the mass in GDP class IV increases.
In Figures 13 and 14 we report two nonparametric estimates of the relation
between an estimate of B and relative GDP for ﬁve selected years: 1950, 1961,
1973, 1985 and 1997.43






















Log of relative GDP
B
Figure 13: Estimate of B:   = 1, β = 2,
¯ aL = 0.5, ¯ aH = 0.5. The thinnest line
refers to 1950, the thickest to 1997






















Log of relative GDP
B
Figure 14: Estimate of B:   = 1, β = 2,
¯ aL = 0.5, ¯ aH = 1. The thinnest line
refers to 1950, the thickest to 1997
We calculated for each country the value of B with the parameters’ values re-
ported in the caption of the ﬁgures, using GDP instead of capital. Then we plotted
each B against the relative GDP value of the corresponding country (hence any
nonparametric estimate is based on 122 observations). We present two cases with
identical parameters’ values except ¯ aH. Figure 13 is based on ¯ aL = ¯ aH = 0.5, which
means that a country receives positive spillovers from countries whose relative GDP
is at most 50% higher, and suﬀers from negative spillovers by countries whose rel-
ative income is at most 50% lower. In Figure 14 we propose a more plausible
parametrization in which the two eﬀects are considered asymmetric and ¯ aH = 1.44
In Figure 14 we observe that in all years B is decreasing with the exception of
GDP class III and, in part, GDP class IV . In particular, in 1950 and 1961, B is
43The criteria used for these regressions are the same as those in Figures 9 and 11.
44In Appendix D we evaluate B as an eﬀective measure of relative productivity by relating it to
the trade structure of manufactured goods, supposing that the trade structure of highly productive
economies should be biased toward exports of manufactured goods. We generally ﬁnd a positive
relationship between B and the net share of exported manufactures.3.4 Empirical Evidence on Distribution Dynamics and Technological Spillovers 29
strictly decreasing in GDP classes I and II, and the increase in GDP class III is
less pronounced than in subsequent years. In our framework, this implies that in
those years poor countries had clearly the highest beneﬁts in terms of technological
spillovers. However, in 1973, 1985 and 1997 the nonmonotonicity of the relation
becomes more evident, with an increase in the central part and decreases in both
tails. We take this fact as evidence of the eﬀect of the polarization of countries,
indicating that: (i) countries at intermediate GDP levels were able to beneﬁt from
richer countries, (ii) countries at low GDP levels were further away from richer
counties and therefore became unable to exploit the positive spillovers; (iii) countries
at high GDP levels suﬀered from the catching-up of countries catching up behind
them.
We remark that in 1985 and 1997, with the exception of very low-GDP countries,
the greatest positive spillovers are received by countries in the GDP range near
2 (0.69 in logs), that is those who are immediately behind the richest but have
few followers (compare this evidence with the fact that the emerging peak of rich
countries in the density of Figure 10 is near 2.5 (0.91 in logs)).
Now we suggest an interpretation of the dynamics observed in the period 1950−
1997 on the basis of our model. For sake of simplicity we assume that there exist
three sets of countries (we refer to relative GDP): the poor, belonging mainly to
GDP class I, the followers, belonging to GDP classes II and III, and the leaders,
belonging to GDP class IV .
In 1950 − 1961 all countries in these three sets grow at positive but diﬀerent
rates. In particular, the productivity of poor countries BP is suﬃciently high to
avoid the appearance of a poverty trap (i.e. BP > Bmin), owing to the technological
transfers from the followers, but their growth rate is low because they are still
in the range of low and decreasing productivity of capital. From Figure 14 we
observe that in 1950 poor countries had a level of B which was remarkably higher
than the other countries, conﬁrming that they were beneﬁting relatively more from
positive technological spillovers. This created the conditions to catch-up with richer
countries.
Followers, especially those in GDP class III, show a higher growth rate than the
other two sets of countries because they beneﬁt from both technological spillover
from leader countries (followers have, on average, a higher B than leaders), and
increasing returns of capital. Finally, leader countries are in a phase of decreasing
growth rate, but still sustained. The level of B for leaders is lower in 1961 than
in 1950, for the catching-up of followers. Figure 15 illustrates this situation. We
remark that the shape of the sf (k,B)/k curve is aﬀected by the interaction (prox-
imity) of the three sets of countries: the path should be interpreted as an average,
observed trajectory, like those estimated in Figures 9 and 11. kP, kF and kL indi-
cate possible average values of capital for the three country sets, which in Figure 14
can be approximately referred to, respectively, the GDP values of 0.15, 1.5 and 2.5
(respectively −1.90, 0.40 and 0.92 in logs, that is approximately the middle of GDP










Figure 15: Nonlinear endogenous growth model with technological transfers
The resulting dynamics is compatible with the empirical evidence on the dis-
tribution dynamics (see in particular Figures 10 and 12). From 1950 to 1961, the
mass in GDP classes I and, in part, II tends to decrease in absolute terms, while
in relative terms it slightly increases due to the higher pace of some of the follower
countries, e.g. those with a higher GDP. The latter tend to reduce the gap with
leader countries and the mass in GDP class III tends to decrease in relative terms,
while the mass in GDP class IV tends to increase. Broadly, in relative terms we
observe a slight tendency to polarization which we argue in this case is mainly due
to the nonlinearity of the growth path. In absolute terms, we observe that the den-
sities of 1950 and 1961 cross in GDP class II. The mass in 1961 is lower before the
intersection and higher after, indicating a global process of positive growth.
In 1962−1973 the dynamics of 1950−1961 is consolidated, given that the growth
path shifts upwards for almost all countries (see Figures 9 and 11). In absolute terms
we have a further decrease in the mass of GDP classes I and II and an increase of
the mass in GDP classes III and IV . In relative terms we have a further increase
in polarization. In particular the mass in GDP classes I, II (in part) and IV
increases, while the mass in GDP class III decreases. In fact, the growth rate in
GDP class III is particularly high. In terms of our model this means that BF has
strongly increased for the higher number of follower countries which beneﬁt from the
technological spillovers from leader countries or that, in other words, for a country
in GDP class III the number of countries with a higher k within P has increased.
In fact, from Figure 14 we observe that in 1973 B strongly increases for countries in3.4 Empirical Evidence on Distribution Dynamics and Technological Spillovers 31
GDP class III (and continues to decrease for countries in GDP class IV ). Notice
also that the value of B clearly decreases for countries in GDP class I and, in part
II. Given the positive growth of all countries, in this period the mass in GDP class
IV increases in absolute and relative terms, contributing further to what we have
deﬁned as medium-run polarization.
The third subperiod, 1974 − 1985, starts with the oil shock. We have already
argued that this could have caused a sudden increase in the rate of depreciation
of capital δ and Bmin (see Eq. (8)). From Figure 14 it appears that B for poor
countries continued to decrease in this period and therefore could not prevent BP
from becoming lower than Bmin, implying that poor countries found themselves in
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Figure 16: Nonlinear endogenous growth model with technological transfers: the
eﬀect of oil shocks
Figure 16 shows the dynamics resulting from an increase in δ starting from a
situation like that in Figure 15. The growth path of all countries shifts down, but
this is particularly disastrous for poor countries because for some of them, i.e. the
ones with capital in the range (0,¯ kU), this means a decrease in their GDP per
capita and a tendency to be absorbed in ¯ kL. The negative eﬀects of the oil shock
were especially strong for follower countries in GDP class III (see the decrease in the
growth path in Figures 9 and 11). We conjecture that these economies were heavily
based on energy-intensive technologies.
The distributions of relative and absolute GDP reﬂect this dynamics showing an
even increasing polarization. The appearance of a poverty trap is demonstrated by32 4 CONCLUSIONS
the fact that GDP class I shows a substantially constant mass in absolute terms
and a marked increase in relative terms. In addition, in 1985 the peak in GDP IV
class becomes clearly visible in relative terms.45 The bump at the border between
GDP classes III and IV is substituted by a gap. In absolute terms the mass in
GDP classes III and IV increases, but these changes are less pronounced than in
previous years, indicating that the process of growth was slowed, but not checked.
We conjecture that the increase in polarization was responsible for the reduction
in BP, proxy for the rate of technological transfers to poor countries (see Figure 14).
On the contrary, polarization beneﬁted follower countries as it reduced the number
of countries lagging behind them, and therefore allowed them to receive only the
positive spillovers from leader countries (see again Figure 14). However, the increase
in BF was outweighed by the strong increase in δ (see the marked decrease of the
growth path of the followers in 1974 − 1985 in Figure 11). Finally, leader countries
in GDP class IV , in particular those with a relative income higher than 3 (about
1.1 in logs), had a reduction in B that we argue was caused by the catching up of
follower countries, as argued by Goodfriend and McDermott (1998) (see Figure 14
for GDP levels above 1.1).
The fourth subperiod, 1986−1997, witnesses a decrease in the rate of deprecia-
tion δ, according to Baily and Schultze (1990).46 However, BP continued to decrease:
compare 1985 and, especially, 1997 with previous years in Figure 14. We argue that
BP remained below Bmin (even if Bmin decreased with δ), and therefore poor coun-
tries remained trapped in the basin of the low-income equilibrium ¯ kL. Diﬀerently,
for follower countries B slightly increased or remained constant. This is compatible
with the behavior of the growth paths in Figures 9 and 11: the path is basically
invariant for GDP classes I and II for both relative and absolute GDP. On the con-
trary, the growth path is strongly shifting upwards for absolute and relative GDP
classes III and IV . These two movements reinforced the tendency to polarization.
In 1997 BL remains much below its level in 1973, at least for relative GDP levels
higher than 3 (1.1 in logs)(see Figure 14). This, coupled with a possible negative
eﬀect on productivity due to the decrease in the investment rate, may explain why
productivity in rich countries did not completely recover to the levels of the ﬁrst
two subperiods (see Figures 9 and 11).
4 Conclusions
The pieces of evidence presented in this paper support the following hypothesis:
before 1973 a tendency for convergence characterized the world income distribution,
45Note that, in absolute terms, the mass in GDP classes I and II does not change much from
1973 to 1985, when compared with the changes occurred between previous periods.
46 Baily and Schultze (1990), p. 397, note that Tobin’s q in the US fell well below unity after the
ﬁrst shock, indicating a low evaluation of installed capital (and therefore an increase in the rate
of obsolescence), while in 1987 it reached a value of 0.91, indicating the reversal of the previous
tendency.REFERENCES 33
with all countries following a nonlinear path toward the highest GDP levels. Polar-
ization in this case was a temporary phenomenon. In particular, while the internal
process of accumulation explained the nonlinear shape of the path, international
spillovers allowed productivity, especially of poor countries, to be suﬃciently high
to avoid poverty traps. In 1973 the oil shock shifted downwards the growth path.
This may have been caused by a sudden increase in the rate of obsolescence of cap-
ital. The post-1973 years have been characterized by a decrease in the productivity
parameter B for the poorest and the richest countries, caused by changes in the
pattern of international technological spillovers.
Given the nonlinear shape of the growth path, the temporary shock on the depre-
ciation rate of capital has produced permanent eﬀects as, for low-income countries,
this meant the appearance of a low-development trap. As the income dispersion
of countries increased, the international ﬂow of technologies was interrupted, or at
least reduced, as suggested by the literature on appropriate technology. Speciﬁ-
cally, laggards could not beneﬁt from the technologies developed in richer countries.
The absence of productivity recovery for the richest countries may ﬁnd a partial
explanation in their reduced investment rates and in the increased competition from
followers.
Future research should demonstrate the robustness of these results, in partic-
ular by a direct measurement of international technological transfers, with special
attention to underdeveloped and developing countries.
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A Country Lists
Table 13 contains the sample of countries from Maddison (2001).
Country
Algeria Sierra Leone Paraguay Burma
Angola Somalia Puerto Rico Hong Kong
Benin South Africa Trinidad Tobago Malaysia
Botswana Sudan Australia Nepal
Cameroon Swaziland New Zealand Pakistan
Cape Verde Tanzania Canada Singapore
Central African Togo United States Sri Lanka
Republic Chad Tunisia Bahrain Afghanistan
Comoros Uganda Iran Cambodia
Congo Zambia Iraq Laos
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire Zimbabwe Israel Mongolia
Djibouti Argentina Jordan North Korea
Egypt Brazil Kuwait Vietnam
Gabon Chile Lebanon Austria
Gambia Colombia Oman Belgium
Ghana Mexico Qatar Denmark
Kenya Peru Saudi Arabia Finland
Liberia Uruguay Syria France
Madagascar Venezuela Turkey Germany
Mali Bolivia UAE Italy
Mauritania Costa Rica Yemen Netherlands
Mauritius Cuba West Bank Gaza Norway
Morocco Dominican Republic China Sweden
Mozambique Ecuador India Switzerland
Namibia El Salvador Indonesia UK
Niger Guatemala Japan Ireland
Nigeria Haiti Philippines Greece
Reunion Honduras South Korea Portugal
Rwanda Jamaica Thailand Spain
Senegal Nicaragua Taiwan
Seychelles Panama Bangladesh
Table 13: Sample from Maddison (2001): 122 countries
Table 14 contains the restricted sample of 91 countries.37
Country
Benin Senegal Jamaica Malaysia
Botswana Seychelles Nicaragua Nepal
Cameroon South Africa Panama Pakistan
Cape Verde Tanzania Paraguay Sri Lanka
Central African Togo Trinidad Tobago Austria
Republic Chad Tunisia Australia Belgium
Comoros Uganda New Zealand Denmark
Congo Zambia Canada Finland
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire Zimbabwe United States France
Egypt Argentina Iran Italy
Gabon Brazil Israel Netherlands
Gambia Chile Jordan Norway
Ghana Colombia Syria Sweden
Kenya Mexico Turkey Switzerland
Madagascar Peru China UK
Mali Uruguay India Ireland
Mauritania Venezuela Indonesia Greece
Mauritius Bolivia Japan Portugal
Morocco Costa Rica Philippines Spain
Mozambique Dominican Republic South Korea
Namibia Ecuador Thailand
Niger El Salvador Taiwan
Nigeria Guatemala Bangladesh
Rwanda Honduras Hong Kong
Table 14: Sample from Maddison (2001) and PWT 6.1: 91 countries
B Transition Matrices: Full Sample
In this appendix we report the transition matrices computed for the full sample
from Maddison (2001), in both absolute and relative values.
B.1 Absolute Values
We ﬁrst present the results for the ﬁrst period (1950−1973) and then for the second
(1974 − 1997).38 B TRANSITION MATRICES: FULL SAMPLE
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 334 0.55 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 215 0.35 0.41 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 188 0.31 0.18 0.30 0.07 0.02 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 487 0.02 0 0.01 0.47 0.20 0.28 0 0 0.01 0 0 0
II+ 305 0 0 0 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.01 0.03 0.02 0 0 0
II++ 443 0 0 0 0.24 0.19 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 0 0
III- 87 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.02
III+ 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.18 0.25 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.12
III++ 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.51 0.03 0.03 0.10
IV- 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.52 0.14 0.34
IV+ 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 0.29 0.33
IV++ 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.32 0.45
Table 15: transition matrix 1950-1973, 122 countries, absolute values
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 0.24 0.38
Table 16: ergodic distribution 1950-1973, 122 countries, absolute values
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 215 0.44 0.22 0.31 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 114 0.34 0.25 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 191 0.22 0.19 0.38 0.07 0.05 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 380 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.43 0.19 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
II+ 193 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0 0
II++ 462 0.02 0 0.01 0.22 0.13 0.51 0.05 0.02 0.05 0 0 0
III- 184 0 0 0 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.02
III+ 78 0 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.13 0.40 0 0 0.03
III++ 264 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.13 0.48 0.03 0.02 0.08
IV- 149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.19 0.40
IV+ 147+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.32 0.52
IV++ 307 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.18 0.25 0.56
Table 17: transition matrix 1974-1997, 122 countries, absolute values
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.28
Table 18: ergodic distribution 1974-1997, 122 countries, absolute valuesB.2 Relative Values 39
B.2 Relative Values
We ﬁrst present the results for the ﬁrst period (1950−1973) and then for the second
(1974 − 1997).
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 93 0.55 0.24 0.22 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 78 0.32 0.55 0.10 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 45 0.40 0.13 0.29 0.07 0.04 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 673 0.03 0 0.01 0.51 0.19 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
II+ 399 0.01 0.01 0 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
II++ 520 0 0 0.01 0.27 0.19 0.46 0.02 0.01 0.04 0 0 0
III- 108 0 0 0 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.33 0.13 0.37 0 0 0.01
III+ 97 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0 0.23 0.34 0.36 0 0.01 0.02
III++ 221 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.15 0.14 0.60 0.01 0.03 0.05
IV- 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 0.19 0.37
IV+ 87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.33 0.24 0.41
IV++ 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.31 0.44
Table 19: transition matrix 1950-1973, 122 countries, relative values
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.21 0.35
Table 20: ergodic distribution 1950-1973, 122 countries, relative values
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 206 0.43 0.23 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 103 0.38 0.30 0.31 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 168 0.25 0.23 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 468 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.40 0.21 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0
II+ 240 0.01 0 0 0.33 0.28 0.37 0 0 0.01 0 0 0
II+ 582 0.02 0 0 0.26 0.15 0.50 0.02 0.01 0.04 0 0 0
III- 142 0 0 0 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.31 0.13 0.39 0.01 0 0.01
III+ 62 0 0 0 0.06 0 0.03 0.27 0.13 0.45 0.02 0.02 0.02
III++ 235 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.56 0.03 0.02 0.05
IV- 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.41
IV+ 127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.16 0.33 0.50
IV++ 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.17 0.28 0.53
Table 21: transition matrix 1974-1997, 122 countries, relative values40 B TRANSITION MATRICES: FULL SAMPLE
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.13
Table 22: ergodic distribution 1974-1997, 122 countries, relative values
B.3 GDP Relative to the US
In this appendix we normalize the observations on GDP with respect to the GDP
of the US. We omitted from the analysis the observations on the US, since they
represent transitions of a state absorbed at the GDP level of 1.












































Figure 17: Growth rates vs per capita GDP relative to the US
\Growth rate 1950-73 < 1.6% 1.6%,3.6% > 3.6%
GDP\Growth rate 1974-97 < −0.1% −0.1%,1.9% > 1.9%
0 − 0.05 I- I+ I++
0.05 − 0.18 II- II+ II++
0.18 − 0.65 III- II+ III++
> 0.65 IV- IV+ IV++
Table 23: state space deﬁnition for GDP relative to the US
FIRST PERIOD: 1950 − 1973B.3 GDP Relative to the US 41
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.20
Table 24: ergodic distribution 1950-1973, GDP relative to the US
− + ++
I 0.50 0.26 0.24
II 0.45 0.24 0.31
III 0.29 0.21 0.50
IV 0.35 0.24 0.40
Table 25: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class, 1950-1973, GDP
relative to the US
I II III IV
1950 0.07 0.49 0.34 0.10
1973 0.11 0.42 0.31 0.16
ergodic 0.05 0.20 0.26 0.50
Table 26: distribution dynamics, 1950-1973, GDP relative to the US
SECOND PERIOD: 1974 − 1997
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02
Table 27: ergodic distribution 1974-1997, relative to US GDP
− + ++
I 0.38 0.26 0.36
II 0.33 0.21 0.46
III 0.31 0.15 0.54
IV 0.17 0.30 0.53
Table 28: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class, 1974-97, relative to
US GDP42 C DATA ON PER WORKER GDP
I II III IV
1973 0.11 0.42 0.31 0.16
1997 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.15
ergodic 0.61 0.25 0.10 0.04
Table 29: distribution dynamics, 1974-1997, log of GDP per capita relative to the
US


































































Figure 18: Initial, ﬁnal and ergodic distribution for the two periods (log of GDP per
capita relative to the US)
C Data on Per Worker GDP
In this appendix we present the results on labor productivity, using data from the
Penn World Table 6.1 for a restricted sample of 91 countries for the period 1961 −
1997. Growth and GDP classes are calculated applying the same procedure used for
relative and absolute GDP.C.1 Absolute Per Worker GDP 43
C.1 Absolute Per Worker GDP
\Growth rate 1961-73 < 2.1% 2.1%,4.1% > 4.1%
GDP\Growth rate 1974-97 < 0.1% 0.1%,2.1% > 2.1%
0 − 8.11 I- I+ I++
8.11 − 8.78 II- II+ II++
8.78 − 10 III- II+ III++
> 10 IV- IV+ IV++
Table 30: state space deﬁnition for absolute per worker GDP
FIRST PERIOD: 1961-1973
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 106 0.49 0.11 0.32 0.03 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 40 0.42 0.13 0.35 0.07 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 95 0.35 0.14 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 79 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.51 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.06 0 0 0
II+ 18 0 0 0 0.50 0.06 0.17 0 0.17 0.11 0 0 0
II++ 60 0.02 0 0 0.23 0.07 0.35 0.12 0.02 0.20 0 0 0
III- 122 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.39 0.24 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.02
III+ 88 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.32 0.26 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.05
III++ 163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.20 0.44 0.02 0.03 0.05
IV- 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 0.34 0.25
IV+ 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.43 0.24
IV++ 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.46 0.22
Table 31: transition matrix 1961-1973, 91 countries, per worker GDP
The associated ergodic distribution is:
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.40 0.24
Table 32: ergodic distribution 1961-1973, 91 countries, per worker GDP
I II III IV
1961 0.31 0.21 0.38 0.10
1973 0.20 0.16 0.42 0.22
ergodic 0 0 0 1.00
Table 33: distribution dynamics 1961-1973, 91 countries, per worker GDP44 C DATA ON PER WORKER GDP
SECOND PERIOD: 1974-1997
Obs I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
I- 207 0.54 0.15 0.29 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I+ 55 0.53 0.20 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I++ 141 0.32 0.16 0.40 0.04 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0
II- 106 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.44 0.09 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
II+ 36 0.03 0 0 0.22 0.19 0.42 0.03 0.06 0.06 0 0 0
II++ 125 0 0 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.49 0.03 0.02 0.14 0 0 0
III- 269 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.01 0.38 0.21 0.36 0 0 0.01
III+ 159 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.37 0.24 0.31 0.02 0 0.04
III++ 361 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.29 0.16 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.07
IV- 175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.23 0.39
IV+ 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.26 0.27 0.46
IV++ 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0.28 0.44
Table 34: transition matrix 1974-1997, PWT, 91 countries, per worker GDP
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.26
Table 35: ergodic distribution 1974-1997, PWT, 91 countries, per worker GDP
− + ++
I 0.49 0.16 0.34
II 0.44 0.13 0.43
III 0.38 0.21 0.42
IV 0.28 0.27 0.45
Table 36: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class, PWT, 91 countries
1974-97, per worker GDP
I II III IV
1973 0.20 0.16 0.42 0.22
1997 0.21 0.10 0.35 0.34
ergodic 0.09 0.05 0.29 0.57
Table 37: distribution dynamics, PWT, 91 countries, 1974-1997, per worker GDPC.2 Relative Per Worker GDP 45
C.2 Relative Per Worker GDP
\Growth rate 1961-73 < 2.1% 2.1%,4.1% > 4.1%
GDP\Growth rate 1974-97 < 0.1% 0.1%,2.1% > 2.1%
0 − 0.25 I- I+ I++
0.25 − 0.6 II- II+ II++
0.6 − 1.8 III- II+ III++
> 1.8 IV- IV+ IV++
Table 38: state space deﬁnition for relative per worker GDP
FIRST PERIOD: 1961-1973
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.11
Table 39: ergodic distribution 1961-1973, PWT, 91 countries, relative per worker
GDP
− + ++
I 0.49 0.16 0.36
II 0.48 0.11 0.41
III 0.36 0.24 0.41
IV 0.34 0.39 0.27
Table 40: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class, PWT, 91 countries
1961-73, per worker GDP
I II III IV
1961 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.19
1973 0.22 0.19 0.37 0.22
ergodic 0.17 0.12 0.29 0.42
Table 41: distribution dynamics, PWT, 91 countries, 1974-1997, per worker GDP
SECOND PERIOD: 1974-1997
I- I+ I++ II- II+ II++ III- III+ III++ IV- IV+ IV++
ergodic 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.11
Table 42: ergodic distribution 1974-1997, PWT, 91 countries, relative per worker
GDP46 D TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS AND TRADE
− + ++
I 0.49 0.15 0.35
II 0.39 0.18 0.43
III 0.34 0.20 0.46
IV 0.28 0.28 0.44
Table 43: ergodic distribution normalized for each GDP class, PWT, 91 countries
1974-97, relative per worker GDP
I II III IV
1973 0.22 0.19 0.37 0.22
1997 0.24 0.18 0.34 0.24
ergodic 0.27 0.18 0.30 0.25
Table 44: distribution dynamics, PWT, 91 countries, 1974-1997, relative per worker
GDP
D Technological Spillovers and Trade
In this Appendix we assess the eﬀectiveness of B as an index of productivity. Follow-
ing the insights of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, we conjecture that positive
variations in productivity should be reﬂected in variations of the composition of
the trade structure of a country, in particular of manufactured goods. A higher B
should translate into an increase of the share of export of manufactures on total
export relatively to the share of imports of manufactures on total imports (denote
it net share of exported manufactures). We are not interested in absolute values of
import and exports, as they may depend on a number of factors (exchange rates,
economic policies, etc.). Instead, focusing on the composition of imports and exports
of manufactures should be more informative on the relative eﬃciency and hence on
the technological level of a country.
We provide some examples from a selected subset of countries. Generally we
ﬁnd a positive relation between the net share of exported manufactures and B as
expected, but such relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant for all the countries
considered. The net shares of exported manufactures (NEM) for the period 1962−
1997 are calculated from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2002 , while
B is calculated assuming that   = 1, β = 2, aL = 0.5 and aH = 1. In the following
ﬁgures we report NEM vs B for United States, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, Ghana,
Hong Kong, Argentina, Italy and Germany (* in the caption denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at 1%).47



















Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 19: US*






















Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 20: Japan*

























Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 21: Korea
















Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 22: Nigeria





























Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 23: Ghana













Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 24: Hong Kong*



















Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 25: Argentina





























Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 26: Italy*





















Net export of manufactures
B
Figure 27: Germany
From these results we conclude that B is an reasonable measure of the techno-
logical level of an economy.